DyEKF: Dynamic Protection of Approximate NoC Communications Against Hardware Trojan Attacks

Le résumé fourni par la source

Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) architectures rely heavily on Network-on-Chip (NoC) for efficient inter-core communication. However, large volumes of exchanged data lead to higher latency and bandwidth usage. Approximate communication in NoCs has emerged as a promising solution to address these challenges by tolerating a degree of data inaccuracy for specific application domains. Nevertheless, this tolerance opens new vulnerabilities, particularly to Hardware Trojan (HT) attacks within Intellectual Property (IP) cores or NoC routers. In this article, we address these vulnerabilities and propose a dynamic protection mechanism tailored for approximate NoC communications. We first analyze the threat posed by HT-induced flit drops and demonstrate their severe impact on the system performance. We then introduce DyEKF, a dynamic protection technique that leverages an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to reconstruct dropped flits, minimizing the need for retransmissions. Experimental results show that DyEKF significantly mitigates the impact of HT attacks on the CIFAR-10 database used as an example, achieving up to 2x reduction in retransmission request rates compared to data reconstruction with linear interpolation methods, while maintaining comparable application quality.

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