Partisan Politics and Executive Accountability: Argentina in Comparative Perspective

Le résumé fourni par la source

Democratic functioning depends not only on the electoral process, but also on executive branch oversight, through such institutions as the courts, private "civil society" groups, and specialized public sector organizations. There is a tension between partisan monitoring of the executive and impartial oversight, and this tension will be sharper in some constitutional structures than in others. The paper argues that if party discipline is relatively high in a presidential system and if courts and civil society are weak, then executive oversight will be relatively more politicized. The paper then applies the framework to the case of Argentina (a presidential system with closed-list proportional representation). It contrasts that case with Brazil (presidential/open-list PR), the United States (presidential/plurality) and Germany (parliamentary), all cases where nonpartisan oversight is more consistent with the constitutional structure.

Ce résumé expose les affirmations des auteurs. BNTIC ne l’interprète pas comme une validation indépendante des résultats.