Data and Code for: Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes
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This project contains code and data for the article "Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes". Many people are impatient. We test a prediction for how to make incentives work particularly well when people are impatient over effort: implement time-bundled contracts that make the payment for future effort increase in current effort. We find empirical support for this prediction using a randomized evaluation of an incentive program for exercise (walking) among diabetics in India. On average, a time-bundled contract generates as much effort as a time-separable linear contract, yet at a 15% lower cost. Moreover, time-bundled contracts perform roughly 30% better among individuals with above-median impatience over effort than those with below-median. Pooled across contracts, incentives increase daily steps by roughly 20% and improve blood sugar control relative to a control group.
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