Russian strategic deterrence at the time of war : Analysis of the core elements in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Le résumé fourni par la source

Through use of the concept of deterrence, deterrence theory, and strategic culture theory, this thesis will seek to assess how Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in tandem with its broader strategic behaviour, align with the greater principles of deterrence and Russia’s orientation within the discipline. The lens of this concept and these theories will be applied to various aspects of Russian foreign policy in action, as fundamentally it relates to decision-making based on perceptions of credibility and capability of self and adversary. This framework provides structure when analysing how Russia acts out its deterrence, and what drives it. As deterrence theory emphasises credibility as an essential criterion for effective deterrence, this thesis will use this theory and understanding of concept to analyse to what extent Russia’s leadership and capabilities are credible, and therefore able to coerce adversaries against taking action that threatens or is detrimental to Russia, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. It also helps underpin ideas about why deterrence fails and explains unintended consequences. Lastly, the integration of nuclear weapons into deterrence will be analysed with the aim of establishing what role these weapons play within Russia’s coercive deterrence posture when engaged in a regional conflict such as the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Ce résumé expose les affirmations des auteurs. BNTIC ne l’interprète pas comme une validation indépendante des résultats.