Strategic Design of CO2-Reuse Pathways for Sustainable Aviation Fuel: A Game-Theoretic Techno-Economic Analysis

Le résumé fourni par la source

The aviation sector is difficult to decarbonize due to limits on aircraft electrification, making sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) a critical near-term solution. This study integrates Aspen-based process modeling with game-theoretic optimization to design a multi-agent SAF production network comprising coal gasification and CO2-assisted natural gas reforming for syngas production, and Fischer–Tropsch (FT) synthesis for SAF production. Techno-economic parameters from Aspen simulations inform an agent-based model in which agents maximize their net present value subject to capacity and demand constraints. Three decision-making frameworks are compared: (i) social welfare optimization, (ii) cooperative bargaining - symmetric (equal bargaining power) and asymmetric (bargaining power weighted by agents’ competitiveness outside cooperation), and (iii) competitive equilibria modeled as generalized Nash equilibrium. The results show that social welfare maximization excludes coal and yields the highest total profit, strongly favoring the FT agent's pay-off. Cooperative bargaining includes all agents in the system and promotes CO2 and water recycling with only a 3.5% profit reduction; symmetric bargaining shifts profit toward coal, while asymmetric bargaining partially restores FT agents’ share. Under bargaining, complete CO2 recycling is achieved, integrating coal without direct emissions. Under strict competition, upstream syngas producers do not participate in the network, and reliance on external syngas reduces overall profit by 12.4%. These results show that game-theoretic modeling for process synthesis reveals strategic incentives for process design that are typically obscured in more traditional superstructure-based optimization frameworks.

Ce résumé expose les affirmations des auteurs. BNTIC ne l’interprète pas comme une validation indépendante des résultats.