Establishing Psychological Phenomena: An Alternative Methodological Perspective on Scientific Practice
Le résumé fourni par la source
We argue that psychology should aim its empirical research efforts at establishing phenomena. Psychology typically conceptualizes research in terms of testing theories against data. An alternative approach in philosophy of science views the scientific method in terms of a three-level relation between data, phenomena, and theory. In this conceptualization, phenomena are understood as robust features of the world, which are evidenced by patterns in data. Theories explain phenomena by positing the existence and causal operation of entities, processes, and structures that give rise to these phenomena. We argue that much psychological research should be understood as establishing phenomena rather than testing theories. Focussing on establishing phenomena will aid the robustness of psychological research, while simultaneously creating a better foundation for theory creation. We outline how envisioning scientific research in terms of the relation between data, phenomena, and theory has far-reaching consequences: a) it offers an alternative methodological organization, where the description and free exploration of data is of greater importance than it currently is, b) it formulates new ways of thinking about methodological concepts such as replicability, generalizability, and validity, and c) it allows us to develop guidelines for incorporating this perspective into practice that can substantially improve psychological science.
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Le contrôle bibliographique ouvert
DOI retrouvé dans Crossref DOI retrouvé ; titre concordant.
- Titre Crossref
- Establishing Psychological Phenomena: An Alternative Methodological Perspective on Scientific Practice
- Date Crossref
- 31/03/2026
- Éditeur
- Center for Open Science
- Type
- posted-content
Ce recoupement confirme des métadonnées liées au DOI. Il ne confirme ni la méthode ni les conclusions de l’étude, et il ne compte pas comme une seconde source scientifique indépendante.