Subsystem-Aware Stackelberg Game for Optimal Anti-Jamming Power Control in Periodically Switched Cyber-Physical Systems

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This paper presents a subsystem-aware Stackelberg game framework for optimal power control in periodically switched cyber-physical systems (PSCPS) operating over wireless networks under jamming attacks. To account for subsystem switching dynamics, a switching Kalman filter is employed for mode-dependent state estimation, with corresponding error covariance matrices derived for each mode. The impact of switching is quantified using a subsystem-importance-based weighting factor, obtained by analyzing trace variations in the covariance matrices. This factor is integrated into the defender’s utility function to enable adaptive power control. First, a subsystem-aware Stackelberg game model without power constraints is formulated, and the equilibrium strategies of the defender (leader) and the attacker (follower) are obtained via the convex optimization. The framework is then extended to the power-constrained scenario, where feasibility issues arise. By analyzing the boundary and extreme points of the solution space, closed-form equilibrium strategies are derived. Simulation results show that the proposed approach enhances the resilience of PSCPS against jamming attacks in wireless communication environments.

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