Avocado: An Interpretable Fine-Grained Intrusion Detection Model for Advanced Industrial Control Network Attacks

Résumé fourni par la source

Industrial control systems (ICS), as critical infrastructure supporting national operations, are increasingly threatened by sophisticated stealthy network attacks. These attacks often break malicious behaviors into multiple highly camouflaged packets, which are embedded into large-scale background traffic with low frequency, making them semantically and temporally indistinguishable from normal traffic and thus evading traditional detection. Existing methods largely rely on flow-level statistics or long-sequence modeling, resulting in coarse detection granularity, high latency, and poor byte-level interpretability, falling short of industrial demands for real-time and actionable detection. To address these challenges, we propose Avocado, a fine-grained, multi-level intrusion detection model. Avocado’s core innovation lies in contextual flow-feature fusion: it models each packet jointly with its surrounding packet sequence, enabling independent abnormality detection and precise localization. Moreover, a shared-query multi-head self-attention mechanism is designed to quantify byte-level importance within packets. Experimental results show that Avocado significantly outperforms state-of-the-art flow-level methods on NGAS and CLIA-M221 datasets, improving packet-level detection ACC by 1.55% on average, and reducing FPR and FNR to 3.2%, 3.6% (NGAS), and 3.7%, 4.3% (CLIA-M221), respectively, demonstrating its superior performance in both detection and interpretability.

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