Dependencies of the European Union and the world on Russian nuclear fuel cycle services, and how to reduce them

Résumé fourni par la source

While the European Union (EU) and other Western nations are weaning themselves off the Kremlin's fossil energy resources, global nuclear energy producers remain closely tied to Russia's nuclear industry. One in four nuclear reactors worldwide is connected to Russia (either operating domestically, built abroad, or under construction using Russian technology), and relies on spare parts, maintenance, and fuel from state-owned Rosatom. Russia contributes approximately 6 % of global uranium production, 20 % of conversion capacity, 46 % of enrichment capacity, and 10 % of nuclear fuel fabrication capacity. This work explores the EU's and the global community's dependence on Russian nuclear fuel cycle services. In response to growing geopolitical tensions, particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU has taken steps to reduce this reliance and enhance self-sufficiency. Key measures include expanding uranium conversion capacity, increasing fuel production for VVER-440 reactors, and better utilization of existing enrichment infrastructure. Reducing Russia's influence is possible but will require long-term commitment, political determination, and acceptance of higher nuclear energy costs, especially for conversion and enrichment services. With continued effort, full independence from Russian nuclear fuel cycle services is considered achievable between 2030 and 2035. • Market (EU/world) concentrations of nuclear fuel cycle services are quantified. • Russian suppliers are particularly strong in providing enrichment services. • VVER-440 reactor fuel supply has been identified as a current bottleneck. • Feasibility of reducing Western dependencies on Russia are discussed. • Western countries can be independent from Russia by 2030–2035.

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