Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy from the Perspectives of Carbon Pricing and Taxation Mechanisms

Le résumé fourni par la source

Under the dual-carbon goal and the carbon market mechanism framework, determining how the government, enterprises and emission reduction technology supplier groups strategically select emission reduction strategy by weighing respective benefits under different scenarios has emerged as a critical research question. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model involving enterprises, emission reduction technology suppliers and the government, and carries out simulation analysis on different scenarios. The results show that the increase of carbon price or carbon tax can force enterprises to carry out carbon emission reduction. At the same time, improve the intention of enterprises to upgrade emission reduction technology, and promote the research and development of emerging emission reduction technology. For the government, as the carbon price increases and enterprises are forced to reduce emissions, the government will tend to stop taking active regulatory policies such as carbon penalty and carbon subsidy, thus reducing the cost of government carbon regulation. The conclusions and suggestions of this study can provide theoretical reference for enterprises’ emission reduction strategy selection and government regulation.

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