Epistemic Injustice and Inquiry

Résumé fourni par la source

When and how are we subject to epistemic injustice as inquirers? A natural answer draws on our collective understandings of epistemic injustice and of inquiry: Epistemic injustice against inquirers happens when what we understand as epistemic injustice prevents us from engaging successfully in what we understand as inquiry. I argue that this approach offers too narrow a view of how we experience epistemic injustice as inquirers. The traditional, Frickerian framing of epistemic injustice was conceived against the backdrop of 20th-century analytic epistemology’s focus on analyses of epistemic success states like knowledge and justified belief. It centers on how knowers can be unjustly undermined in their capacity to attain and communicate these success states. But inquiry is a process rather than a state. It often takes place in community and in collaboration with others. It highlights our fundamental epistemic dependence and interdependence. I propose and demonstrate an expanded approach that starts by considering what we need to become good inquirers and to inquire well and then considers how systemic injustices can leave these needs unmet. My discussion produces two key results: It broadens our collective understanding of epistemic injustice, and it shows that our needs as inquirers extend beyond times when we are engaged in processes of inquiry.

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