Can Government Venture Capital Restrict Strategic Limited Partners from Intervening in Fund Decisions? Evidence from China

Le résumé fourni par la source

By manually determining the investment objectives of limited partners (LPs) and their interventions in venture capital (VC) funds through investment announcements issued by listed companies in China, we investigate whether government VC can restrain the interventions of strategic LPs in VC funds. The empirical results, including a series of robustness tests, show that in VC funds, the greater the presence of government VC as LPs, the fewer seats strategic LPs occupy on investment committees, and the less likely they are to have veto rights. Further analysis indicates that even when the government VC is not in the same region as the strategic LPs, does not occupy seats on the investment committee, or does not appoint observers to the investment committee, the conclusions still hold. These findings imply that government VC can restrict strategic LPs from intervening in fund-management decisions.

Ce résumé expose les affirmations des auteurs. BNTIC ne l’interprète pas comme une validation indépendante des résultats.