Do users' perceptions of neighbors' cleaning behavior of shared sanitation facilities act as a credible threat in urban low-income communities? A case study of Khulna City, Bangladesh

Le résumé fourni par la source

ABSTRACT Shared sanitation facilities in low-income urban communities are at risk of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Using a questionnaire survey of 402 respondents from four communities in Khulna, Bangladesh, this study explored the game structure of each community by categorizing them into four groups based on respondents' perceptions of their own and others' cooperative habits. The results indicated that the structure of the communities with a high proportion of respondents who reported that ‘both themselves and others are cooperative’ represented an infinitely repeated game with the perception of others' habits as a credible threat. The linear probability model showed that the perception of others' habits did not significantly associate with socio-psychological factors when the perception of others' habits appears to be a credible threat to cooperation. However, in communities where the perception of others' habits does not appear to be a credible threat to cooperation, the perception of other users' behavior is significantly associated with socio-psychological factors. People in such communities choose cooperation because they are critically aware of the behavior of others. Focusing on the game structure may enable one to identify determinants supporting cooperation as equilibrium in managing common pool resources.

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