Accès ouvert déclaré 2024 editorial

The harms of promoting the lab leak hypothesis for SARS-CoV-2 origins without evidence

James C. Alwine, Felicia Goodrum, Bruce W. Banfield, David C. Bloom, William J. Britt, Andrew J. Broadbent, Samuel K. Campos, Arturo Casadevall, Gary C. Chan, Anna R. Cliffe, Terence S. Dermody, W. Paul Duprex, Lynn W. Enquist, Klaus Frueh, Adam P. Geballe, Marta Gaglia, Stephen A. Goldstein, Alexander L. Greninger, Gigi Kwik Grönvall, Jae U. Jung, Jeremy P. Kamil, Seema S. Lakdawala, Shan‐Lu Liu, Micah A. Luftig, John P. Moore, Anne Moscona, Benjamin W. Neuman, Janko Nikolich‐Žugich, Christine M. O’Connor, Andrew Pekosz, Sallie R. Permar, Julie K. Pfeiffer, John G. Purdy, Angela L. Rasmussen, Bert L. Semler, Gregory A. Smith, David A. Stein, Koenraad Van Doorslaer, Sandra K. Weller, Sean P. J. Whelan, Andrew D. Yurochko

14Citations signalées — pas une note de qualité

39Institutions déclarées

6Pays d’affiliation déclarés

Résumé fourni par la source

Science is humanity's best insurance against threats from nature, but it is a fragile enterprise that must be nourished and protected. The preponderance of scientific evidence indicates a natural origin for SARS-CoV-2. Yet, the theory that SARS-CoV-2 was engineered in and escaped from a lab dominates media attention, even in the absence of strong evidence. We discuss how the resulting anti-science movement puts the research community, scientific research, and pandemic preparedness at risk.

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Contrôle bibliographique ouvert

DOI retrouvé dans Crossref DOI retrouvé ; titre concordant.

Titre Crossref: The harms of promoting the lab leak hypothesis for SARS-CoV-2 origins without evidence
Date Crossref: 17/09/2024
Éditeur: American Society for Microbiology
Type: journal-article

Ce recoupement confirme des métadonnées liées au DOI. Il ne confirme ni la méthode ni les conclusions de l’étude et ne compte pas comme une seconde source scientifique indépendante.

Institutions déclarées

University of Arizona University of Pennsylvania Queen's University Queens University University of Florida University of Alabama at Birmingham University of Maryland, College Park Johns Hopkins University SUNY Upstate Medical University University of Virginia University of Pittsburgh Princeton University Oregon Health & Science University Vaccine & Gene Therapy Institute of Florida University of Washington Fred Hutch Cancer Center University of Wisconsin–Madison Institute of Virology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences Howard Hughes Medical Institute University of Utah Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center New Orleans Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center Shreveport Emory University The Ohio State University Duke University Cornell University Columbia College Royal College of Physicians Columbia University Texas A&M University The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center University of Saskatchewan University of California, Irvine Northwestern University Oregon State University University of Connecticut Institute of Molecular Biology and Biophysics Washington University in St. Louis

Une affiliation ne permet pas de déduire la nationalité d’un auteur.

Sujets associés

SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 ResearchCOVID-19 epidemiological studiesViral Infections and Outbreaks Research

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