Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism with Supervised Fuzzy Shapley Value

Résumé fourni par la source

The distributed training of federated machine learning, referred to as federated learning (FL), is discussed in models by multiple participants using local data without compromising data privacy and violating laws. In this paper, we consider the training of federated machine models with uncertain participation attitudes and uncertain benefits of each federated participant, and to encourage all participants to train the desired FL models, we design a fuzzy Shapley value incentive mechanism with supervision. In this incentive mechanism, if the supervision of the supervised mechanism detects that the payoffs of a federated participant reach a value that satisfies the Pareto optimality condition, the federated participant receives a distribution of federated payoffs. The results of numerical experiments demonstrate that the mechanism successfully achieves a fair and Pareto optimal distribution of payoffs. The contradiction between fairness and Pareto-efficient optimization is solved by introducing a supervised mechanism.

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