Équilibres pour les enchères inversées quand le budget est annoncé – Quelques résultats préliminaires

Résumé fourni par la source

We consider a budget-constrained reverse auction: offers are accepted until somepredefined budget is exhausted. Payments are discriminatory: bidders receive their own bid aspayment when they win the bid. Bidders have a private value for their item which is uniformlydistributed between 0 and 1; they are risk-neutral and items are indivisible. For small budget andan arbitrary number of bidders, as well as in the case of two bidders, we find an equilibrium biddingfunction. When possible, we compare with the equilibrium bidding function of target-constrainedreverse auctions.

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