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2023 article

Should Gig Platforms Decentralize Dispute Resolution?

13Citations signalées — pas une note de qualité
3Institutions déclarées
2Pays d’affiliation déclarés

Résumé fourni par la source

Problem definition: Disputes on online labor platforms have traditionally been mediated by the platform itself, which is often viewed as unhelpful or biased. However, there are emerging platforms that promise to resolve disputes with a novel tribunal system and relegate dispute resolution to individual platform users through a voting mechanism. We aim to examine the dispute resolution systems used by traditional platforms (i.e., the centralized dispute system) and emerging platforms (i.e., the decentralized dispute system) in order to assess whether the latter has an advantage over the former. Methodology/results: We use game theory to analyze both the centralized and decentralized dispute systems, and we model the tribunal’s voting game using the global games framework. Our findings indicate that in order to achieve a fair voting outcome, it is crucial to have sufficient heterogeneity in the assessments of tribunal members. Moreover, the decentralized dispute system outperforms the centralized dispute system only when the freelancer’s skill level is sufficiently high. Lastly, the decentralized dispute system has the potential to induce a more socially optimal quality level from the freelancer. Managerial implications: Our findings provide insights on the optimal adoption and implementation of the decentralized dispute system. The decentralized dispute system is more effective for tasks that involve subjective evaluations, and platforms should avoid strategies that homogenize the assessments of tribunal members. Moreover, platforms should consider switching to the decentralized dispute system only if they are able to verify the skill level of freelancers through certification or other means. Lastly, the decentralized dispute system may be more appealing to policy makers because of its potential to induce a more socially optimal outcome. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0398 .

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Contrôle bibliographique ouvert

DOI retrouvé dans Crossref DOI retrouvé ; titre concordant.

Titre Crossref
Should Gig Platforms Decentralize Dispute Resolution?
Date Crossref
01/03/2024
Éditeur
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Type
journal-article

Ce recoupement confirme des métadonnées liées au DOI. Il ne confirme ni la méthode ni les conclusions de l’étude et ne compte pas comme une seconde source scientifique indépendante.

Institutions déclarées

Une affiliation ne permet pas de déduire la nationalité d’un auteur.

Sujets associés

Digital Economy and Work TransformationSharing Economy and PlatformsDigital Platforms and Economics

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