Political Density,Perks and Institutional Environment

Le résumé fourni par la source

Taking the selected data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share in 2005-2007 as a sample,combining different ownership arrangements and forms of perks,this paper reveals the motivation of rent-seeking of network-built between government and enterprises,and the urgent needs of construction of institutionalize in the China’s innovation process.The research finds that the network of political relations of stated-owned enterprises brings a larger scale of perks;in contrast the network of private companies significantly restrains the scale;it is much more effective to speed up developing the law,property rights and other restrain to suppress the tendency of political rent-seeking.The research results show that:under the background of low level in law and neglecting the property protection,to restrain perks and reduce the enterprises’ cost,it is not only to solve the traditional agent relationships,but also more important is to consider the system shortage brings high transaction costs to enterprises.

Ce résumé expose les affirmations des auteurs. BNTIC ne l’interprète pas comme une validation indépendante des résultats.